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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AUTOMOBILE
NEGLIGENCE CASES: A PROCEDURAL
ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
Morris D. Forkoschf
In New York, as in other states, legislative response to overcrowded
conditions in courts has led to increasingly frequent disposition of
cases by the use of summary judgment procedure. Though originally
restricted to specified contract actions and actions to enforce judgments,
summary judgment was available by 1959 in all but matrimonial
actions.' With the 1959 amendment 2 the courts began to apply sum-
mary judgment procedure in negligence actions,3 and the practice
was continued with enactment of Rule 3212 of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules (CPLR).4 Nevertheless, court dockets continue to burgeon
and, as automobile negligence cases contribute increasingly to the
congestion of our judicial machinery, the need for greater reliance on
the summary judgment procedure becomes more apparent.
In theory, when "there is no bona fide issue of fact bearing on the
liability issue, the plaintiff's remedy is to move for summary judg-
ment."r In practice, however, courts quickly find a "bona fide issue
of fact" in automobile negligence cases. They affirm that summary
judgment can be invoked only in rare instances,6 because negligence
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1936, M.A. 1938, J.S.D. 1948, New
York University; LL.B. 1930, LL.M. 1932, St. Johns University; Ph.D 1952, M.S.Sc. 1956,
New School for Social Research. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
Donald R. Adair of the Cornell Law Review in the preparation of this article.
1 See CAR MO-FoRKOSCH NEW YoRK PRAacnc § 701 (8th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited
as CARMODY-FoRKoscH]. Even in a matrimonial action, summary judgment can be used in
favor of a defense based on documentary evidence or official records.
2 The 1959 amendment to N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 113, [1959] N.Y. Laws 2269, extended
summary judgment to negligence actions by allowing its use in all but matrimonial actions.
The current rule is N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 3212.
3 For early citations, see C MoDY-Fo.Koscss Naw YoRK PP.Aar cE § 465 (7th ed.
1956, Supp. 1960 at 153.)
4 "Except . . . with respect to a matrimonial action, any party may move for summary
judgment in any action, after issue has been joined." N.Y.R. Crv. PRAC. 3212(a).
5 Binninger v. Grillo, 28 App. Div. 2d 1100, 284 N.Y.S.2d 189-90 (1st Dep't 1967). The
court stated: "it appears that the plaintiff has a clear case on the liability issue ..
Id. at 1100, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
6 Regnal Realty Corp. v. McBride Transp., Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 703, 268 N.Y.S.2d 103
(3d Dep't 1966); Connell v. Buitekant, 17 App. Div. 2d 944, 234 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1st Dep't
1962); Schneider v. Miecznikowski, 16 App. Div. 2d 177, 226 N.Y.S.2d 944 (4th Dep't
1962); Steinbach v. Denker, 13 App. Div. 2d 795, 215 N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1961). See
also note 17 infra.
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cases do not lend themselves to such precipitate dispositionJ Indeed,
the courts are inclined not to grant summary judgment even when
the only real issues are collateral to that of negligence.
8
This judicial reluctance probably stems from two factors. First,
our concept of negligence depends upon the "reasonable man" stand-
ard, which is flexible and ordinarily can be applied only after full
development of the facts upon trial.9 The constitutional right to a
jury trial serves only to reinforce the traditional judicial inclination
to retain the law-fact division of labor that dumps "reasonableness"
issues into the lap of the jury.10 A second, unexpressed factor that
probably leads courts to deny summary judgment is fear that a general
loss of judicial business would otherwise result; liberal use of summary
procedures could lead to a form of computer determination or,
eventually, to a compensation system of recovery not based upon
negligence.
Judicial hesitancy to use the summary judgment procedure in
automobile negligence cases has caused its "usefulness under the pres-
ent practice [to be] . .. sharply circumscribed,"-" thereby impairing the
ability of the courts to handle the rising flood of cases. 12 The present
7 Hajder v. G. & G. Modems, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 651, 213 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1st Dep't
1961).
8 E.g., Grisanzio v. Cafiso, 28 App. Div. 2d 718, 282 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dep't 1967),
in which defendant alleged that plaintiff and he were engaged in the course of their
common employment at the time of the accident, and thus that plaintiff's exclusive
remedy was workmen's compensation. The Appellate Division for the Second Department
held that summary judgnient could not be granted, because there was a triable isnid
"whether, as plaintiff maintains, his work day on the date of the accident terminated at
the close of the conference in New York .... Id. at 718, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
9 See, e.g., Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 382-83, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879, 881-82
(2d Dep't 1960) (footnote omitted):
[E]ven when there is no dispute as to the physical facts of the acddtnt and when
there is no claim of contributory negligence, [the difficulty] . . .is that the unre-
solved issue still remains as to whether the defendant used such reasonable pre-
cautions to avoid the accident as would ordinarily be used by careful, prudent
persons under the circumstances . .. . Ordinarily such issue must be decided on
trial .... Evidence of the physical facts may establish negligence prima fade, but
in such a case the court may seldom direct a verdict though the plaintiff's evidence
is not contradicted or rebutted by the defendant. Whether negligence is estab-
lished prima facle by direct or circumstantial evidence, the question as to
whether the defendant was ht fault in what he did or failed to do is ordinarily
one of fact, to be detdmined by the jiiry, unless the jury is waived ....
See also Gatto v. Kruger, 28 App. Div. d 1007, 284 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't i967); Cooper
v. Greyhound Bus Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 173, 215 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1961).
10 See generally Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't
1960); CARMODY-FoRKosc-r, supra note 1, §§ 732-35.
11 Cooper v. Greyhound Bus Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 173, 215 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (3d
Dep't 1961),
12 In Donlon v. Pugliese, 27 App. Div. 2d 786, 787, 277 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't
1967), a three-justice majority wrote:
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situation compels a search for a more flexible formula; the latest cases
indicate a growing judicial disenchantment with the current practice
and a desire to find a method by which automobile negligence cases
can be decided without trial. At present, however, courts generally
feel constrained to follow the weight of precedent in the area and do
not take the initiative in looking for a solution.
Maintaining the status quo or adopting a whole new system
of compensation, however, are not the only alternatives for disposition
of automobile negligence cases. A middle path is relaxation of the
strict judicial approach to summary judgment procedure. By a close
analysis of undisputed facts the courts will find many more cases ripe
for summary judgment than they do at present. One virtue of this
solution is that the courts will continue to make ad hoc determinations,
and thus will be able to deny such motions whenever the interests of
justice require. The purpose of this article is to suggest the relaxation
of the strict judicial approach to summary judgment motions in auto-
mobile negligence cases and to recommend standards for judicial
consideration.
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEW YoRK LAW
A. Power To Grant Summary Judgment
CPLR 3212(g) authorizes the court, "if practicable, [to] ascertain
what facts are not in dispute or are incontrovertible," and then to
"make an order specifying such facts," so that they may "be deemed
established for all purposes in the action."' 3 As indicated by the ital-
icized words, some facts that are in dispute may be judicially "as-
certained" to be "incontrovertible." This statutory power should not
be limited to matters of judicial notice or the like, for such matters
can be held "incontrovertible" without the statute. Thus, rule 3212(g)
must, to some extent, give a court power not only to ascertain what
facts are not in issue, but also to decide, or determine, actual issues. 14
When the remedy of summary judgment was expanded to cover tort actions,
which then constituted, and still do, the most prolific cause of calendar congestion
and delay and the most massive obstruction to prompt and expeditious disposi-
tion of Court business, the clear intent was to furnish another weapon in aid
of the later objective; and it seems the unquestionable duty of Special Term and
applicable Judges to utilize it in cases as clear as this, rather than to strain to
find issues, however nebulous, which may preserve an unfounded claim for liti-
gation or negotations.
13 (Emphasis added).
14 See Kaiser v. State, 55 Misc. 2d 576, 285 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Greiff v.
Mazzei (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1968, at 18, col. 4.
[Vol. 53:814
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This issue-determining power might be viewed as an infringement
of the jury's function. If used properly, however, it is merely another
tool for determining that "the issue is not genuine, but feigned." The
problem today is that courts are too timid in affirming, on any given
record, that there is no triable issue. This statutory grant assures that
courts, in determining that any apparent issue is feigned, need not too
gingerly avoid intruding upon the jury's fact-finding functions.
B. Issues that Must Be Undisputed
The general requirement that a court find no triable issue before
granting summary judgment was limited by CPLR 3212(c), which pro-
vides that "[t]he existence of a triable issue of fact as to the amount or
the extent of the damages shall not bar the granting of summary judg-
ment." Despite the apparent clarity of the language, the courts have
held that a denial of the existence of damages will foreclose summary
judgment.15 Yet, neither a plaintiff nor an attorney is likely to bring
a suit when no damage has occurred. At least when there is some be-
lievable proof of damages, the defendant's mere denial should not
prevent summary judgment.'0 Since the extent of damages, even if
15 In Steinbach v. Denker, 13 App. Div. 2d 795, 215 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (2d Dep't
1961), the majority wrote:
There is a sharp conflict as to the force of the impact between the two vehicles
and as to the injuries which resulted from the collision. Under the circumstances,
without full testimony as to the happening of the accident in order to determine
the nature and extent of the injuries and whether they could have resulted from
this accident, the damages cannot be properly assessed.
The sole dissenter stressed the majority's agreement that there was no issue of liability,
quoted the rule's language, and contended that the defendant's claim of no injuries was
belied by his attorney's affidavit in opposition: "He does not challenge the claim of per-
sonal injuries; in fact, he refers to plaintiff's allegation of 'whiplash injuries."' Id. at 796,
215 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (dissenting opinion). A similar factual contradiction between the
majority and a lone dissenter is found in Rubin v. Andino, 11 App. Div. 2d 663, 201
N.Y.S.2d 567 (Ist Dep't 1960). See also Smith v. Marbury, 18 App. Div. 2d 936, 284 N.Y.S.2d
503 (2d Dep't 1963); Chmela v. Vought, 15 App. Div. 2d 812, 225 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't
1962); Sonnino v. Gol-Pak Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 740, 224 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Ist Dep't 1962);
Goldman v. Reese, 13 App. Div. 2d 994, 216 N.Y.S.2d 746 (2d Dep't 1961); Ruppert v.
Building Materials Dist., Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 621, 196 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Ist Dep't 1960).
16 In a more recent case than those cited in note 15 supra, the Second Department,
with Justice Christ, the Steinbach dissenter, now Acting PJ., held:
Defendant's negligence is clear. The dissenting Justices assert that a question of
fact exists as to whether any injury at all was sustained, thus necessitating a
plenary trial of all the issues .... That rule is inapplicable here. The proofs
show that the injured plaintiff was hospitalized for three weeks after the accident
for injuries sustained as a result thereof. This is sufficient basis to narrow the
necessity for proof to an assessment of damages.
Brodersen v. Katzman, 26 App. Div. 2d 693, 272 N.Y.S.2d 636-37 (2d Dep't 1966). Of course
the earlier cases were not overruled, but merely held to be "inapplicable." Since Justice
Christ concurred with the majority in Goldman v. Reese, 13 App. Div. 2d 994, 216 N.Y.S.2d
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negligible, can be contested in the separate hearing limited to the
issue,17 rule 3212(c) should be interpreted broadly to allow summary
judgment whenever the issues concerning negligence are undisputed.
Proximate cause issues may appear to be an exception to this rule.
If defendant argues that his negligence did not proximately cause
plaintiff's injuries, perhaps a plenary trial should be held, for the issue
of proximateness strikes more at the issue of liability than at damages.
Yet, rule 3212(c) refers to the "amount or the extent" of damages, and
thus is authority for granting summary judgment even when issues
other than the mere monetary amount of damages remain. In many
cases even arguable proximateness issues could be left to the later pro-
ceeding, because all the facts of the case need not be developed to re-
solve the issue. For example, if defendant negligently injures plaintiff,
and if there is intervening negligence on the part of the physician, de-
ciding whether defendant's negligence caused the full damage will not
require complete proof concerning how the initial injury was inflicted.
In any ordinary trial the court regularly excludes proof of damages that
are not shown to be related or connected to defendant's acts. This
general experience and understanding should be brought to bear upon
the evidence and pleadings at summary judgment so that, when only
damage issues exist, whether about their extent, existence, or proxi-
mateness, summary judgment will be denied only when resolution of
the proximateness issue will require full development of the evidence
concerning negligence.'5
A second limitation on the necessary scope of a case ripe for sum-
mary judgment is that absence of contributory negligence often is just
746 (2d Dep't 1961), however, the quoted language most likely means only that, when
plaintiff presents sufficient believable proof of damages, the mere denial of defendant
will not prevent summary judgment. This, of course, is somewhat short of the rule
recommended here, that, except in very rare cases, plaintiff's presentation of some be-
lievable proof of damages will be sufficient for summary judgment.
17 N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. 3212(c) [hereinafter cited ds CPLR] provides that
[for] a triable issue of fact as to the amount or the extent of the damages ....
[t]he court shall order an immediate hearing before a referee, before the court, or
before the court and a jury ... to assess the amount or the extent of the damages.
The court can then grant summary judgment.
18 It might seem that allowing the proximateness issue to be determined at the
separate hearing on da.mages would frustrate rule 3212, for the entire liability case
arguably could then be presented in the special hearing. Nevertheless, this view is more
theoretical than realistic. First, summary judgment presumably xvill not be granted in
cases actually requiring full development of the facts; as the courts become more experi-
enced in using the summary judgment rule, they should become better at recognzing
such cases. Second, judges have discretionary power to exclude evidence not sufficiently
relevant or material to the issue in the special hearing.
[Vol. 53:81,4
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part and parcel of the issue of defendant's negligence. While present-
ing his case, plaintiff may "at the same time [have] presented the facts
which establish the elements of a defense and require a jury deter-
mination."'19 Also, in some cases the facts of the accident themselves
raise a suspicion of contributory negligence that is not adequately
overcome by a mere denial. Thus, if plaintiff tripped down a stairway
or was struck by defendant's car while crossing an unmarked street,
plaintiff's lack of contributory negligence can only be affirmed after
he has been subjected to cross-examination at trial. Often however,
real issues of contributory negligence will not be raised unless defendant
has affirmative proof or has suggested to his attorney promising lines
of inquiry to be made in cross-examining plaintiff. Consequently, re-
gardless of how the burden of proof is allocated at trial, plaintiff's case
on a pretrial summary judgment motion often should be viewed as
adequate, provided only that he has alleged absence of contributory
negligence. Triable issues concerning contributory negligence will
exist only if defendant pleads or otherwise presents particular facts
tending to show contributory negligence.
C. The Prima Fade and Res Ipsa Loquitur Concepts
The primary obstacle to summary determination, of course, is the
litigant's right to a plenary trial. As Cardozo expressed it: 'To justify a
departure from that course and the award of summary relief, the court
must be convinced that the issue is not genuine, but feigned, and that
there is in truth nothing to be tried."20 The requirements, however,
are not as rigid as might appear at first glance. In an automobile negli-
gence case in New York a plaintiff must ordinarily prove defendant's
negligence, his own freedom from contributory negligence, and dam-
ages. To ensure submission of his case to the jury, plaintiff must present
a prima facie case.21 Similarly, to prevent a pretrial motion by defen-
19 DiSabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 307, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184, 196 (1st Dep't 1959).
20 Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N.Y. 267, 270, 146 N.E. 375, 376 (1925) (citations omitted).
See CARoDv-FoRaoscir, supra note 1, § 700, at 649: "If we look at the motion as a pre-
liminary 'trial' to determine if issues of fact exist, and not to determine them if they
are found to be present, then the rationald of this procedural device becomes apparent."
(Emphasis in original).
21 See CARmoDy-FoRxoscH, supra note 1, § 707 (Supp. 1967-68 at 468), concerning de-
fendant's motion to dismiss upon plaintiff's case:
The granting of such a motion requires "a determination by the trial court that
by no rational process upon the proof submitted could the jury have based a
finding in favor of plaintiffs." Sisson v. City of N.Y., 20 AD2d 695, 246 S.2d 846,
citing Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241. For example, where
plaintiffs make out a prima fade case, in a p.i. trial, on the issue of negligence
and freedom from contributory negligence, the court is without power to direct
1968]
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dant for summary judgment, a plaintiff's pleadings, affidavits, and
depositions must disclose a prima facie case-i.e., evidentiary facts
sufficient, "if adduced at trial [to] ... preclude the court from directing
a verdict for the defendant as a matter of law."22 A prima face case, of
course, does not require a finding for the plaintiff. It merely constitutes
sufficient evidence to permit a verdict for the plaintiff.2 3
A res ipsa loquitur case is a special type of prima facie case. It
arises from an injury-causing event that ordinarily would not occur
absent defendant's negligence.24 Thus, plaintiff need not produce evi-
dence concerning what defendant actually did; evidence proving the
circumstances of the injury will be sufficient to defeat the motion for
a nonsuit and take the case to the jury. Although the res ipsa doctrine
will ordinarily not shift the burden of producing evidence to the de-
fendant,25 as a practical matter his failure to bring forth rebutting evi-
dence will probably result in a verdict for plaintiff.
a verdict, Reimer v. N.Y. Kosher Provisions, Inc., 25 AD2d 511, 267 S.2d 70, al-
though a verdict is against the weight of the credible evidence when the court is
"not required to give credence to a story so inherently improbable that we are
morally certain it is not true." Lopez v. Union Settlement Assn., 25 AD2d 520,
267 S.2d 219, quoting Bottalico v. City of N.Y., 281 AD 339, 119 S.2d 704.
22 Galumbeck v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 113, 284 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (N.Y
City Civ. Ct. 1967). See Ullery v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 1111,
284 N.Y.S.2d 576, 577 (Ist Dep't 1967), granting defendant's motion because plaintiff had
no cause of action where, as lessee of the truck, and a passenger at the time of the
accident, "[h]e had the legal right to control its operation, and the negligent conduct of
the operator is imputable to him." Cf. DiSabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d
184 (1st Dep't 1959).
23 In Rehm v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), the district court, in
applying res ipsa loquitur under New York law, stated:
The proper meaning of "prima-fade case" is that quantum of evidence tending
to prove each material fact that a plaintiff must introduce to sustain his burden
of going forward with the evidence, i.e., render himself immune from a non-
suit. With the evidence in this posture, the trier of the facts may reasonably
find for the plaintiff by drawing the permissible inferences favorable to him.
This does not mean that the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict or that
the burden is shifted to the defendant.
Id. at 159 (emphasis in original). See also Mott v. B. Gertz, Inc., 146 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1955).
24 See George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 115-16, 38 N.E.2d 455,
459 (1941); Curley v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 438, 71 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947).
25 Mhe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relieves a plaintiff from the burden of pro-
ducing direct evidence of negligence, but it does not relieve a plaintiff from the
burden of proof that the person charged with negligence was at fault.
George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 115, 38 N.E.2d 455, 459 (1941). See
Rosenthal, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New York, 22 CORNELL L. Q.
39 (1936). Professor Prosser criticized the use of "res ipsa loquitur" as "a definite obstacle
to any dear thought," W. PaossER, ToRxs § 40, at 232-39 (3d ed. 1964), but it is used in
all states and here presented as set forth in Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E.
36 (1935).
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In some negligence cases "the prima fade proof is so convincing
that the inference of negligence arising therefrom is inescapable, if not
rebutted by other evidence."281 In these cases defendant's failure to offer
an explanation should result in a directed verdict for plaintiff.27 Al-
though this circumstance might arise in any negligence case, it is par-
ticularly likely to occur in a res ipsa loquitur context. After all, in order
to qualify as a res ipsa case, the plaintiff's evidence must establish that
the accident ordinarily would not have occurred absent defendant's
negligence, with the defendant offering no contrary evidence. We might
call such a convincing case a "special res ipsa" case.
Both the res ipsa and special res ipsa concepts are the products of
evolution. As a type of case became more commonplace, negligence
could be inferred more readily, and the burden of producing evidence
shifted gradually to the defendant. This evolutionary process holds
the key to relieving court congestion by reducing the number of auto-
mobile negligence trials, for automobile cases tend to be of recurrent
types.
First, courts should expand the special res ipsa category, and,
second, they should more closely relate the criteria for a directed ver-
dict and those for a summary judgment. When res ipsa facts are un-
disputed in pretrial proceedings, courts should more willingly treat
them as special res ipsa, thereby forcing defendant to offer some sub-
stantial explanation. If none is forthcoming, summary judgment
should be granted.
II
FRoM REs IPSA TO SPECIAL RES IPSA
The procedural difference between ordinary res ipsa loquitur and
special res ipsa loquitur was pointed out in the landmark case of George
Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York. 28 A break occurred in an underground
water main installed by the city. Plaintiff introduced evidence that the
26 Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 383, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882 (2d Dep't 1960)
(citation omitted). See also George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38
N.E.2d 455 (1941).
27 Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1960); DiSabato
v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1st Dep't 1959). But see Salomone v.
Yellow Taxi Corp., 242 N.Y. 251, 151 N.E. 442 (1926), where plaintiff had established prima
fade evidence of negligence and defendant offered no exculpatory proof; the court re-
versed summary judgment for the plaintiff and held that the negligence issue had to go
to the jury.
28 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941).
1968]
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city failed to shut off the main within a reasonable time after it re-
ceived notice of the break, but produced no evidence that the break
was caused by the city's negligence. The city introduced rio evidence
showing the cause of the break, but did offer evidence showing that,
whatever the cause, it was not attributable to negligence of the city.
The court upheld plaintiff's contention that proof of the facts per-
mitted application of the res ipsa doctrine, which the court said in-
volved "a commonsense appraisal of the probative value of circum-
stantial evidence." 29 Although the city had "produced evidence
intended to meet the prima facie case established by the plaintiff,"3 0
it did not completely rebut plaintiff's case. The trial court therefore felt
that the inference of negligence Was dictated as a matter of law, and it
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 1
On appeal, Chief Judge Lehman, rejecting the view that the res
ipsa facts were conclusive of the city's negligence, espoused the tradi-
tional view of the doctrine.
The direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff might be
justified if the rule of res ipsa loquitur created a full presumption
in favor of the plaintiff. It is without logical foundation if res ipsa
loquitur is only a common-sense rule for the appraisal of the pro-
bative force of evidence which enables an injured person, in proper
case, to establish prima facie that the injury was caused by the de-
fendant's negligence, thotgh the injured person may be unable to
produce direct evidence of want of care in any particular. 32
Cases from other jurisdictions were then cited for the proposition that
even where a defendant does not produce [any] evidence to rebut
the plaintiff's prima facie case established by the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur, it is for the jury to determine whether the
inference of negligence should be drawn.33
The trial court, it was felt, was incorrect in relying on the earlier case
of Hogan v. Manhattan Railway Co.,34 a res ipsa case in which the de-
fendant offered no evidence and in which a directed verdict for plain-
tiff was affirmed,
for the reason that the undisputed evidence raised a presumption
of negligence against the defendant.
29 Id. at 115, 38 N.E.2d at 459, quoting Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234, 196
N.E. 36, 38 (1935).
30 Id. at 118, 38 N.E.2d at 461.
31 Id. at 114, 38 N.E.2d at 459.
32 Id. at 119, 38 N.E.2d at 461.
33 Id. at 119, 38 N.E.2d at 462. For the cases pro and con, and a discussion of the
procedural effect, see W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 40, at 232-39.
34 149 N.Y. 23, 43 N.E. 403 (1896).
[Vol. 53:814
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A verdict for the defendart on the record as it stands would be
set aside as contrary to the evidence.
The plaintiff sustained the burden of proof and it was incum-
bent upon the defendant to offer evidence, if any existed, to rebut
the presumption of negligence.35
The Foltis opinion commented that
in no case has it been held that a verdict may be directed where
[as here] evidence is presented by the defendant which weakens
such inference, even though it does not conclusively rebut it. Very
little evidence might suffice to rebut a presumption.36
Chief Judge Lehman continued to distinguish Foltis from a special
res ipsa case:
There may be cases where the prima facie proof is so convincing
that the inference of negligence arising therefrom is inescapable
if not rebutted by other evidence. We need not now determine
whether that was true in the Hogan case. In most cases it is not true
and it is certainly not true here where the plaintiff's evidence, even
while unrebutted, left serious doubt whether the break in 1988 was
due to conditions which might have been avoided by the exercise
of care in 1929.37
Chief Judge Lehman then attempted to formulate a correct procedural
definition of res ipsa loquitur:
Where a plaintiff establishes prima facie by direct evidence that
injury was caused by negligence of the defendant the court may
seldom direct a verdict, though the plaintiff's evidence is not con-
tradicted or rebutted by the defendant. In such cases the question of
whether the defendant was in fault in what he did or failed to do
is ordinarily one of fact to be determined by the jury unless the
jury is waived. The practice should be the same where under the
rule of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff establishes prima facie by
circumstantial evidence a right to recover.3,
The Foltis opinion, then, affirms that a special res ipsa case
"seldom" arises. Nevertheless, in the case itself defendant had pre-
sented some rebuttal evidence, which had to be weighed by a jury
against the res ipsa case presented by plaintiff. Thus, the broad rule
35 Id. at 25-26, 43 N.E. at 403, quoted in George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York,
287 N.Y. 108, 120, 38 N.E.2d 455, 462 (1941).
36 George Folis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 120-21, 28 N.E.2d 455, 462
(1941).
37 Id. at 121, 38 N.E.2d at 462 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 122, 38 N.E.2d at 46.3 (emphasis added).
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suggesting that most res ipsa cases must be given to the jury even if un-
rebutted is dictum, if not mere prediction.
Although the Foltis view might have been reasonable in 1941,
today it seems unnecessarily conservative, at least with respect to auto-
mobile negligence cases. Experience reveals that, when a plaintiff
presents a res ipsa case and defendant offers nothing, the jury will
nearly always return a verdict for plaintiff. Many automobile accidents
are of regularly recurring types. There is no reason that the courts
cannot begin to categorize the resulting lawsuits and define when the
"proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence arising there-
upon is inescapable if not rebutted by other evidence."3 9 Of course, if
a court waits until all the evidence is presented at trial, as in Foltis,
then little, if any, of the court's time is saved by directing a verdict.
Since the jury might occasionally find for defendant, it might seem
fairer at that point to let the jury decide the case. But on a summary
judgment motion the court has an opportunity to save considerable
time. In a res ipsa case in which defendant has offered or suggested
nothing substantial in rebuttal, justice seems best served, in the long
run, by granting summary judgment for plaintiff, i.e., treating the
case as special res ipsa.40 Reaching such a conclusion seems perfectly
in keeping with the court's power under rule 3212(g) to "ascertain what
facts are not in dispute or are incontrovertible." 41
III
FROM NONSUIT TO RES IPSA TO SPECIAL RES IPSA
Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp.4 2 illustrates how, with
closer analysis of the facts of each case, the courts can narrow the scope
39 Id. at 121, 38 N.E.2d at 462.
40 But see Weiss v. Garfield, 21 App. Div. 2d 156, 158, 249 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (3d Dep't
1964), in which, speaking of the standards for directing a verdict contained in former Civil
Practice Act § 457a, the court said:
In pursuance of this section it has been held that even if a court would under the
circumstances of the case, on a trial, set aside a verdict as contrary to the weight
of evidence, it would nevertheless not be justified in granting summary judgment
and that summary judgment is authorized only where, if the same facts which
appear in the moving and opposing papers were adduced upon the trial, the
court would be warranted in directing a verdict.
CPLR 4401 sets no test for when the motion for directed verdict shall be granted and
therefore replaces the prior legislative standard with a standard relying on case law. See
CARmoDY-FoRKosc, supra note 1, § 707 (Supp. 1967-68 at 468). The language in Weiss
is therefore no longer authoritative.
41 See pp. 816-17 supra.
42 17 N.Y.2d 132, 216 N.E.2d 324, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1966).
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of proof required of a plaintiff in avoiding a nonsuit. It also reveals
how the courts can find more cases to be of the traditional res ipsa
variety, and the opinions evince a judicial approach that will aid in
finding many of these to be special res ipsa cases and thus ripe for
summary judgment. Thus, although the case only decided whether
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case sufficient to go to the
jury, it suggests how the courts might in some cases avoid the necessity
of trial altogether.
The plaintiff, a passenger in a northbound car, was injured when
defendant's truck, "moving southerly on the road, came over into the
northbound lane and struck the car .... ,43 At trial the defendant of-
fered no explanation of the accident and presented no proof concerning
negligence. The judgment on the jury's verdict for the plaintiff was re-
versed on appeal but reinstated by the Court of Appeals, which held:
"In such a situation, showing this and nothing more, a case of negli-
gence is made out prima facie sufficient to go to the jury to determine
liability."44 The court also distinguished some earlier cases, relied on
by the appellate division, that suggested the plaintiff should have been
nonsuited. The court added:
Thus there should be more legal flexibility on what is negli-
gence as applied to the control of moving vehicles and the question
left open to... the jury where the record shows a skid, or the ex-
planation for a skid, or a car on the wrong side of the road, or the
explanation of why it is there, or the need for the passenger in a
car to act in relation to its operation.45
In a concurring opinion Judge Burke sought to narrow the court's
holding:
I would reverse solely on the ground that proof of "mere skid-
ding" is prima fade evidence of negligence in this case where plain-
tiff was not a passenger in defendant-respondent's car. There are
obvious distinctions between a plaintiff who is a guest-passenger
and one who is a stranger. The former not only assumes some risk
in accepting the gratuitous transportation but also is in the advan-
tageous position of having the opportunity to observe whether the
defendant exercised reasonable care in the operation of the ve-
hide. ... On the other hand, the stranger who is injured by defen-
dant's vehicle's skidding into the opposite flowing lane of traffic
or up onto a sidewalk, under conditions known to the defendant
alone, is at a singular disadvantage. 46
43 Id. at 134, 216 N.E.2d at 324, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
44 Id. at 135, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
45 Id. at 136-37, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
46 Id. at 136-37, 216 N.E.2d at 325-26, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117 (concurring opinion). The
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Thus, Judge Burke objected to the majority's apparent lumping to-
gether of all passengers, and would recognize a prima facie or res ipsa
case only if the plaintiff was not a passenger in defendant's vehicle. He
believed that, if the plaintiff was defendant's passenger, added issues
would immediately be suggested, e.g., assumption of risk or contributory
negligence in failing to warn or advise defendant of dangers.4 7 Further,
such a plaintiff might know what acts of defendant caused the skid
into the wrong lane.
The difference between the majority and Judge Burke is not ex-
traordinarily important, since under either rule the defendant can
cross-examine a passenger-plaintiff, as well as present his own evidence,
concerning any particular facts suggesting the defendant was not neg-
ligent or showing that the plaintiff assumed some risk. The majority
only held that such a plaintiff need not affirmatively present such
matters. The difference is important, however, if one contemplates
granting summary judgment to the plaintiff in Pfaffenbach. After all,
if one affirms that the proof was sufficient to go to the jury, then it must
have been assumed that the accident ordinarily would not have oc-
curred unless defendant were negligent. If the case appeared on sum-
mary judgment and the defendant offered nothing, the motion should
have been granted. If the plaintiff had been defendant's passenger,
however, at least an issue concerning assumption of risk might have
required a jury's finding.
The Pfaffenbach majority rationalized its holding in the following
manner:
Rigidity of legal rules which piece together conduct in the
management and control of a moving vehicle in separate compart.
ments under "negligent" and "non-negligent" labels has not only
failed to succeed as an instrument of adjudication; it has succeeded
in confusing the business of deciding motor vehicle accident cases
consistently. Modem experience suggests we can be less certain
of the precision of our categories in this field of adjudication than
we had confidently assumed a generation or so ago.4 8
majority does not refer to "mere skidding." Apparently the defendant skidded over into
the opposite lane in which plaintiff was riding. See Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Pfaffen-
bach v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 216 N.E.2d 3g4, 269 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1966).
47 See the majority's statement that whether "the need for the passenger in a car
to act in relation to its operation" should be left to the jury. The full quotation is at p.
825 supra. But, after stating that plaintiff had established a prima fade case, the
majority added: "The same rule, open to additional factual evaluation of his own respon-
sibility for events, would apply to the passenger in a car which goes out of control."
17 N.Y.2d at 135, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 969 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
48 Id. at 136, 216 N.E.2d at 325, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
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This latnguge suggests that mote cases should go to the jury and not
less, and thus might seem to suggest that summary judgment should
not be granted more often. Nevertheless, the discussion was used to
overcome the appellate division holding that the plaintiff should be
nonsuited. The real thrust of the court's opinion is that "there should
be more legal flexibility on what is negligence as applied to the control
of moving vehicles.... ."49 This flexibility was revealed, if not resolved,
by the conflict between Judge Burke and Judge Bergan concerning
what a defendant's passenger would have to prove. The courts should
analyze the facts of each particular case and decide who, as a practical
matter, would submit more evidence if other matters were relevant and
available. In Pfaffenbach, the defendant would have done so, and, since
plaintiff's evidence at least strongly suggested the defendant's negli-
gence, this was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury.
This reasoning will also be helpful on motions for summary judg-
ment. Sometimes the plaintiff's uncontested allegations will constitute
a res ipsa case. If it is clear that any further relevant evidence or con-
tentions would be presented by the defendant and he has presented
none, and if the facts of the case do not raise suspicions (e.g., possible
contributory negligence) requiring cross-examination of the plaintiff,50
then summary judgment for the plaintiff would often be appropriate.
It is also arguable that, in any res ipsa case in which the defendant
has offered or contested nothing, summary judgment should be granted
to the plaintiff. Courts decline to take negligence cases from the jury,
even when the facts concerning what happened are uncontested, because
it is supposedly the jury's function to test the defendant's conduct
against the reasonable man standard. But the unique element of a res
ipsa case is that, unless the defendant comes forth with evidence, no one
knows what he did. Thus, the role of the jury in such a case is reduced
to determining whether negligence will be inferred; and this function
is preserved even though the evidence has already met the legal test that
the injury would not ordinarily have occurred if the defendant had not
been negligent. Submitting the case to the jury, then, merely makes
49 See full quotation at p. 826 supra.
50 If an issue such as contributory negligence did lurk in plaintiff's case (e.g., plain-
tiff pedestrian was struck by defendant's car at night while plaintiff was crossing the
street at an unmarked intersection), it would be unusual for defendant not to argue, in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, that he ought to have an opportunity to
cross-examine plaintiff and to have the jury decide whether to believe plaintiff. Thus,
again, if defendant is actually silent, the court need not be very concerned that issues for
the jury lurk in the case. To think otherwise is only to abide by the long-discarded prin-
ciple that a defendant has a right to put the plaintiff to his proof.
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possible capricious results: in identical cases the juries could reach
diametrically opposite results, even though the reasonable man standard
is irrelevant.
The recommendations of this article are not as far-reaching as the
above argument. All res ipsa cases in which the defendant is silent need
not be resolved without trial. 51 But the argument does suggest that
courts can and should more often decide that "the prima facie proof is
so convincing that the inference of negligence arising therefrom is in-
escapable, if not rebutted by other evidence." 52 What is needed is the
judicial flexibility, as displayed in Pfaffenbach, to analyze a case closely
and the judicial willingness to conclude that the plaintiff's evidence
can lead to only one result.53
IV
THE PATTERN OF NEW YORK LAW
In Gerard v. Inglese5 4 the Appellate Division of the Second De-
partment stated that "proof merely of the sudden swerving of an auto-
mobile from the highway is not prima facie evidence of negligence
.... ",15 The court nevertheless granted summary judgment, because in
a deposition defendant
herself . . . furnished the evidence that the accident occurred
while she was driving at a speed of from 40 to 45 miles an hour,
with one hand on the steering wheel, lighting a cigarette with the
other and with her eyes off the road.56
51 One reason for not accepting the argument wholeheartedly is that the res ipsa
concept becomes somewhat confused in automobile negligence cases. Except when plain-
tiff is a passenger in defendant's car, he usually cannot prove what defendant did, but
only what the instrument in defendant's control (the car) did. Thus, with the one ex-
ception, most automobile negligence cases are technically res ipsa ones. Perhaps because
it is readily accepted that cars do not go out of control absent the driver's negligence, the
res ipsa terminology and analysis is often neglected. The Pfaffenbach court did not
mention res ipsa, although the case fits that mold. Thus, the res ipsa test-whether such
injuries would not occur absent defendant's negligence-is, in a summary judgment con-
text, merely a test whether, absent proof from defendant, plaintiff's evidence is quite
convincing.
52 George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 121, 38 N.E.2d 455, 462
(1941).
53 See DiSabato v. Soffes, 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1st Dep't 1959),
where the court, granting summary judgment for the plaintiff, determined that defen-
dant had failed to demonstrate any triable issue of fact and held that defendant's leaving
the car with the ignition on was negligence as a matter of law.
54 11 App. Div. 2d 381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1960).
55 Id. at 383, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
56 Id.
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From these facts and the swerve, the inference of "negligence is not
only reasonable but is, in our opinion, inescapable in the absence of
an explanation consistent with reasonable care. '57
In several types of cases a pattern to the law has become visible.
In cases of brake failure,58 slipping foot (brake to accelerator),59 skid-
ding,O and wrong-lane driving, 61 proof of the one fact has been held
57 Id. See also Barscz v. Tofany, 29 App. Div. 2d 710, 286 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d
Dep't 1968), in which a driver's license was suspended for making a left turn without
signalling.
In Camposano v. Queensboro Motor Corp. (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1967,
at 19, col. 2, the court granted summary judgment where an automobile slid off a wash
rack and struck the ladder on which plaintiff was standing, causing him to fall. The de-
fense was that the mere fact the car "moved off a wash rack does not suggest negligence,"
but the court said: "this argument does not contain the additional fact that an employee
of the defendant was in the automobile at the time it moved off the rack." Id.
58 In Cohen v. Crimenti, 24 App. Div. 2d 587, 588, 262 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1965),
the court said: "The mere fact that the brakes may have failed would not, in and of
itself, serve to impose liability upon the defendants . . . nor, on the other hand, would
the fact that the said defendant testified that brakes failed when they had previously
worked ipso facto absolve the defendants from liability .... " See also Frank v. Smith, 16
App. Div. 2d 826, (2d Dep't 1962); Dranikoff v. Pecoraro (Sup. Ct. 1966), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8,
1966, at 20, col. 3.
59 E.g., Sambrosky v. Callahan (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 21, col. 3,
where the court stated: "Merely showing that the defendant driver's foot slipped from
the brake to the accelerator is not enough to warrant summary judgment ... absent other
evidence to establish careless driving .... " See also Beyer v. Esposito (Sup. Ct. 1967),
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1967, at 20, col. 6.
In Porte v. Lange (Sup. Ct. 1966), N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1966, at 17, col. 5, summary
judgment was granted. The defendant's wet shoe slipped off the brake pedal as she
reached to open the window on the other side of the car, and the car lurched forward
hitting another car.
60 Donlon v. Pugliese, 27 App. Div. 2d 786, 277 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sd Dep't 1967) (sum-
mary judgment granted, citing Plaffenbach); Norman V. Druzbick, 11 App. 2d 1039, 206
N.YS.2d 256 (2d Dep't 1960) (excessive speed causing the skid a fact question for the
jury); Gooch v. Shapiro, 7 App. Div. 2d 807, 182 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Ist Dep't 1959) (no other
evidence indicating negligence, verdict for defendant).
In Filipiak v. Steffen (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1968, at 19, col. 1, while driv-
ing 80-85 miles per hour on Williamsburgh Bridge in drizzle on wet pavement and iron
grating, the driver applied brakes to reduce speed on a curve. The cause of skidding was
held to be for the jury. In Fitzpatrick v. Chin (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 1967, at
18, col. 6, when plaintiff stopped for a red light, defendant claims that he skidded on
wet pavement as he applied the brakes, that it was impossible to turn into the left lane
as traffic was going in the opposite direction, and that nobody was injured. The court
held that a question of fact existed as to questions of negligence and "serious" injury.
See also Velten v. Kirkbride, 20 App. Div. 2d 546, 245 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1963);
Adams v. Leon, 18 App. Div. 2d 998, 237 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't 1963) (loss of control
during U-turn on sand and gravel); Flurry v. Elsworth, (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 10,
1968, at 22, col. 2 ("wet, slippery spot'); Streisand v. DeSabato (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J.,
May 5, 1967, at 21, col. 4.
61 See Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 216 N.E.2d 324,
269 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1966); Campbell v. Towber, 26 App. Div. 2d 628, 272 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d
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sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, but not alone adequate for
granting summary judgment for plaintiff: In cases involving facts such
as backing up,62 rear end collisions,63 blackout and sleepiness, 64 swerv-
Dep't 1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 844, 227 N.E.2d 321, 280 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1967); Breckir v.
Lewis, 21 App. Div. 2d 546, 251 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd sub nor. Breckir v.
Pleibel, 15 N.Y.2d 1027, 207 N.E.2d 865, 260 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1965). All these cases involved
appeals after jury trials. But see Jackson v. Timmons, 29 App. Div. 2d 664, 286 N.Y.S.2d
66 (2d Dep't 1967); Boyles v. Freeman, 29 App. Div. 2d 559, 286 N.Y.S.2d 56 (2d Dep't
1967).
In Blixton v. MacNary, 23 App. Div. 2d 573, 574, 256 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363 (2d Dep't
1965), summary judgment was denied plaintiff, the court stating:
[E]ven where there is no dispute as to the physical facts or a claim of contributory
negligence, an issue remains as to whether reasonable precautions were used by
plaintiff to avoid the accident, and this question is essentially one of fact ....
The mere fact that defendant's vehicle was on the wrong side of the road does
not constitute negligence as a material of law ....
But see the argument, pp. 820-21 supra, and the strong implication in Breckir v. Lewis,
supra, that summary judgment is often appropriate in such cases.
62 Summary judgment for plaintiff was granted in Kowgios v. Johnson, Drake &
Piper, Ind., 25 App. Div. 2d 739, 269 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1st Dep't 1966), Cohen v. Blitz, 52
Misc. 2d 345, 275 N.Y.S.2d 614 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966), and Jackson v. Smalheiser,
(Westchester Counhy Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1967, at 19, col. 2. Summary judgment
was denied in Savastano v. Higgins (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1967, at 19, col. 6.
63 Summary judgment for plaintiff was denied in Connell v. Buitekant, 17 App. Div.
2d 944, 234 N.Y.S.2d 386 (lst Dep't 1962), Schneider v. Miecynikowski, 16 App. Div. 2d
177, 226 N.Y.S.2d 944 (4th Dep't 1962), and Steinbach v. Denker, 13 App. Div. 2d 795,
215 N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1961).
In jasper v. Parent (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1968, at 21, col. 2, summary
judgment was denied when the only fact before the court was that there was a rear end
collision while plaintiff was stopped for a red traffic light. The court stated: "The over-
whelming weight of opinions in this department is against the granting of summary
judgment under facts similar to the instant case." See also Cordes v. Terry, (Sup. Ct.
1968), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1968, at 21, col. 4; Donlon v. Smith (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2,
1967, at 21, col. 5; Strauss v. Parent (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1967, at 20,
col. 1; Kraus v. Parkinson (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1967, at 19, col. 4 (even though
defendant had pleaded guilty to a traffic violation).
Summary judgment for plaintiff was granted in Rodriguez v. Allen (Sup. Ct. 1968),
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1968, at 22, col. 2. Plaintiff had stopped for a traffic light and defendant
admitted "stepping on the accelerator when she intended to step on the brake," thus
colliding with plaintiff. Rejecting the affidavit of an attorney associated with defendant's
attorney, the court noted that plaintiff's motion "is in effect unopposed." See also
Berberich v. Mathieu, 17 App. Div. 2d 780i 232 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 1081, 190 N.E.2d 421, 240 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1963); Puzzi v. Palladino (Sup. Ct. 1966),
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1966, at 19, col. 6 (driver "lost control" and hit car stopped in traffic,
with no excuse offered); Romano v. Bile, 39 Misc. 2d 543, 241 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1963).
64 Summary judgment was granted plaintiff in Frydendahl v. Marsac (Sup. Ct. 1967),
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1967, at 20, col. 2, Stanley v. Burnside, 20 Misc. 2d 932, 192 N.Y.S.2d
452 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 10 App. Div. 2d 652, 199 N.Y.S.2d 408 (2d Dep't 1960), and
Martin v. Koehler, 40 Misc. 2d 762, 244 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1963).
Summary judgment for plaintiff was denied in Donahue v. Romahn, 10 App. Div.
2d 637, 196 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dep't 1960); Kvalheim v. Stockdale (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 5, 1968, at 20, col. 1, and Muller v. Pauling (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J. July 28, 1967,
at 10, col. 4.
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ing,65 and taking one's eyes off the road6 6 summary judgment has some-
times been granted for plaintiff. Summary judgment has been readily
granted when defendant failed to stop for a stop sign 67 and if he was
convicted of reckless driving for the very act proximately causing
plaintiff's injury.68
CONCLUSION
The backlog of automobile negligence cases has reached Brob-
dingnagian proportions, and the future is very bleak. Even with ad-
ditional manpower, our courts need a new means for moving cases
along. The suggestion made here is to grant summary judgment more
often in these cases. This can be accomplished by relaxing somewhat
the traditional requirements for a res ipsa case and recognizing that
many res ipsa cases are ripe for summary judgment (i.e., the special res
ipsa ones) unless defendant offers an explanation or other controverting
evidence. Even if defendant offers something, the willingness to recog-
nize special res ipsa cases will allow the courts more closely to examine
what defendant offers in rebuttal, and often to decide that the issues
truly are feigned. Thus, it might be hoped that, as certain types of
automobile negligence cases continue to recur, the courts will more
readily infer negligence and grant summary judgment.
In Vignola v. Britts, 11 App. Div. 2d 801, 265 N.Y.S.2d 215 (2d Dep't 1960), the court
thought an issue for the jury was whether defendant "had any warning of the likeli-
hood of his falling asleep." Nevertheless, when plaintiff was not a passenger in de-
fendant's car, he could not know about any warning, and defendant could deny it without
fear of contradiction. At least in cases of falling asleep, defendant's denial of warning
should be rejected as incredible. Blackout or heart attack cases, however, raise a possi-
bility of no prior warning.
65 Summary judgment for plaintiff was denied in Rosenthal v. Monastra, 27 App.
Div. 2d 749, 277 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1967). But see Gerard v. Inglese, 11 App. Div. 2d
381, 206 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Rd Dep't 1960).
66 Summary judgment for plaintiff was granted in McCormack v. Maass (Sup. Ct.
1967), N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1967, at 22, col. 4 (defendant took eyes off road to adjust radio),
and Leonc v. Jorgenson (Sup. Ct. 1966), N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1966, at 17, col. 1 (defendant
leaned over to pick up cigarette dropped on floor).
Summary judgment for plaintiff was denied in Haloran v. Klos (Sup. Ct, 1966),
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1966, at 17, col. 7.
67 See Marrella v. Hurwitz (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1967, at 22, col. 1,
where only an attorney's hearsay affidavit was submitted in opposition. The court stated:
"No triable issue is raised. In the first place, 'failure to see a car approaching in un-
obstructed view is incredible as a matter of law'" (citation omitted). See also Hood v.
Murray, 25 App. Div. 2d 163, 268 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1966).
68 DiBone v. Gambucci, 54 Misc. 2d 446, 282 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
See also Kaufman v. Hahn Bros, Fireproof Warehouses, Inc. (Sup. Ct. 1967), N.Y.L.J., Nov.
10, 1967, at 17, col. 2; Cooper v. Mallory, 51 Misc. 2d 749, 273 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
When a question of proximate cause appears from plaintiff's papers, however, the motion
is denied. Susinno v. Smith (Sup. Ct. 1968), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1968, at 21, col. 8.
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